This paper analyses the impact of a growth control law on land values using a variant of the open-city model of Capozza and Helsley (1988).
There is now a large empirical literature documenting the effects of growth controls on housing and land markets. The evidence to date conclusively establishes that growth controls raise housing prices in communities where they are imposed (see Elliot (1981) , Schwartz, Hansen, and Green (1981) , Dowall and Landis (1982) , Schwartz, Zorn, and Hansen (1986) , and Katz and Rosen (1987) ).
Additional evidence suggests that by delaying or banning eventual development, imposition of growth controls lowers the value of agricultural land near the city (see Gleeson (1979) , Black and Hoben (1985) , Knapp (1985) , Vaillancourt and Monty (1985) , and Nelson (1988) Substituting for c using the budget constraint, urban residents achieve utility u(t) when r satisfies the equation
This equation implicitly defines the urban land rent function r = r(t,x,P), with r = -k < 0, r n = U_/U < 0, and r A = y'(t) -u'(t)/U . Land rent is a Capozza and Helsley (1988) . Substituting T(x) and the equilibrium population path into (2), the value of _2 land in equilibrium is written V*(x,0) = V(T(x) ,x,0 jttx ).
Before proceeding to the discussion of growth controls, one final assumption is useful. The assumption is that x(0) = 0, which means that the city starts out as a point at time zero. This, of course, is simply a matter of specifying the time origin.
Growth Controls and Land Values
In the early stages of urban growth, population size is a matter of indifference to consumers, with U and r both equal to zero. At some point, however, the population externality comes into play, so that U and r become negative. Suppose that along the city's equilibrium growth path, r is zero for all x when t < s and negative for all x when t > s (in other words, ' -2 r (t,x,7rx(t) ) = (<) as t < (>) s).
Although it can be shown that r must have the same sign for all x, r is not guaranteed to remain negative after it first falls below zero (it could conceivably become zero again at some future date).
To avoid inessential complications, however, this is assumed to not happen.
Suppose that in response to the population disamenity, the city imposes a growth control law at time s. This law takes the form of a restriction on the future growth of the urban boundary. Formally, the law specifies a new time path x (t) for the boundary beyond s, with x (t) < x(t) holding for t > s c c (see Figure 1 for an example).
Since the law delays development, the conversion date function T(x) is also replaced by a new function T (x) , which C satisfies T (x) > T{x) for x values beyond x(s) (T (x) is the inverse of c c x (t)).
Of course, the law could be written as a "growth management timing c ordinance" (Rosen and Katz (1981) ), in which case the law would directly
An important assumption is that imposition of the growth control is unanticipated by developers. Without this assumption, development activity might accelerate in anticipation of the control.
With x(t) replaced by x (t), the population growth path of the city
beyond s is lowered from P(t) = rcx(t) to P (t) = kx (t) . Consumers c c denied residence in the city locate elsewhere in the economy.
It is important to note that this redirection of population has no effect on the time path of utility in the economy (recall that the function u(t) is exogenous). For such an effect to be absent, the city imposing the control must be small relative to the rest of the economy.
The consequences of relaxing this implicit assumption are discussed below.
Since the lower population growth path improves the city's quality of life relative to the equilibrium path, current and future urban land rents rise.
Conversion of undeveloped land is also postponed by the control, and together, these two effects lead to windfall changes in land values throughout the city. 
The rent expressions in (5) and (6) 
After imposition of the control, value equals V*(x,s)
T (x) .,. 
To compare these expressions, it is useful to rewrite (8) as
(see (2)), it follows that the difference between pre-and post-control land values can be written
- 2 Note that V(T (x),x,s|kx ) is equal to the first three terms in (9) . By c repeating the argument used above, it follows that the integral in (10) is positive (r.. is negative along the the equilibrium path, and x (t) < x(t)). T(x) maximizes V(T,x,0|7tx ) (T(x) is the optimal conversion date under the equilibrium population path). As a result, T(x) also maximizes Figure   1 ), T (x) for x > x(s) can be written T(x) + <5(x), where <5(x) > is c infinitesimal.
Similarly, x (t) = x(t) + e(t) for t > s, where e(t) < is c again infinitesimal. The change in the population path induced by the control 2 can then be written nx (t) -nx(t) = 27tx(t)e(t). Under these C assumptions, the land value difference in (10) becomes
2 )2*x(t)e(t)e"
Since T(x) is the optimal development date, it follows that the partial derivative V equals zero when evaluated at T(x). Eq. (11) Under a continuous control, the land value difference in (10) can be signed at locations near the urban boundary. To see this, consider the behavior of (10) as x falls toward x(s). Since T (x) * T(x) as x + x(s) by continuity of the control, it follows that the difference between the first two terms of (10) approaches zero as x * x(s). With the last term in (10) negative for all x, the entire expression therefore becomes negative as x approaches x(s (8) from (7) and differentiate with respect to x. The result is T(x) , it follows that the term in brackets is positive. With the entire second term therefore positive and the integral negative, the sign of (12) When this cost is taken into account, the spatial growth of the city is slowed relative to the equilibrium path. No effect occurs, however, before time s (x(t) = x (t) for t < s). This can be seen by noting that since r equals zero along the equilibrium path before s, the first-order condition (16) is satisfied by x(t) in this range. Beyond s, the fact that r < holds along the equilibrium path means that the RHS of (16) Suppose also that income and utility vary linearly with t, with y(t) = y + 1/2 #t and u(t) = r + pt. Then, using (1 ) 
a and solving for x yields x(t) = (a + 0t)/0, (18) 1/2 where a = rj -r -iD and $ = k + an . For x(0) = to hold as assumed, a a must equal zero, which then makes x(t) equal to (0/j3)t.
Since the population externality is present under the given utility function for all values of P, the critical date s in the preceding analysis is equal to zero (growth controls are imposed immediately). Consider the optimal -1/2 growth control first.
To find its form ± note that since r = -(a/2)P , the x (t ) integral in (16) is (a/2)(*x (t)
2 )" 1/2 e f 2nxdx = (a/2)x (t)rc 1/2 . Adding this expression to the RHS of (17) and solving for x yields x (t) = (9/B)t (19) Sheppard (1988) analyses the effect of restricting the land area available to various classes of consumers in a static multi-class city.
By conducting static analyses, both of these papers omit key dynamic elements of the growth control problem. 4 Like the commuting cost parameter k, r and D are assumed to be constant over a time.
All of these parameters could be made functions of time without affecting the conclusions of the analysis. 5 From above, this requires that dr(t ,x,P(t) )/dt = r + r P'(t) > holds at t = T(x).
Notingthat P'(t) = 2*x(t)x'(t), and substituting the above expression for x'(t), the second-order condition reduces to r r /(r + 2axr p ) > 0, which holds as long as r > 0.
The first claim follows because r_ = r _ = 3(-k)/3P = 0. The temporal Px xP behavior of r is uncertain because the total derivative dr (t,x,P(t))/dt is ambiguous in sign.
7
Note that r may fall to zero at a given t and x as population declines from P(t) to P (t).
Since r n starts out negative, however, it must be the c P case that (6) exceeds (5). Given that x '(t) = x'(t) > for t < s, x '(t) cannot be zero immediately after s without violating differentiability.
15
The qualification stated in footnote 13 applies here.
16
An attempt was made to investigate the spatial pattern of land value impacts under a linear control using the above example. Unfortunately, much of the ambiguity encountered in the general case remained.
